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The Afghan orphans who were brought up by Wahhabi sheikhs in Pakistani refugee camps during the early Eighties, a decade later took the weapons and installed the Taliban regime in their homeland. Similarly, two generations of disadvantaged Egyptians who attended Saudi-sponsored religious schools in Egypt’s shanty towns, opted for extreme versions of political Islam in the first democratic elections ever held in their country.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore that the waves of protests that shook the Middle East in 2011 have repositioned the theocracy of Saudi Arabia as the main stakeholder in the region. In this article the International Institute for Nonviolence Action- NOVACT wants to explore the relationship between the rebirth of extreme versions of political Islam in Egypt, and the Saudi endeavour to fight, at any human cost, democracy and freedom in the Muslim World. I will argue that the neoliberal structural adjustment policies adopted by the Egyptian regime in the last two decades paved the way for the religious radicalisation of two generations with the Saudi patronage.
Historically, Sufi Orders, chants, and dances have been more common in the outskirts of Cairo than the teachings of the Salafist theologian Mohammed ibn Abd al Wahhab. Similarly, the Egyptian peoples are inclined more to poetry and intellectual debate than state promoted contests to memorise the holy book of Quran. However, Saudi-led processes of social engineering are swiftly changing the social and cultural fabric of this Arab nation. The counterrevolution promoted by Saudi Arabia against the Arab Spring ought to be assessed.
Some clarifications
Some clarifications are necessary to understand the thrust of my argument about the takeover of extreme versions of political Islam at the Egyptian parliament. Firstly, I do not agree with the assertion that every single political actor that speaks in the language of religion is a terrorist. Secondly, to refer to the religious movements that have taken over in Egypt since the revolution I will use the term extreme versions of political Islam rather than fundamentalism. In fact, fundamentalism is a term coined in 1920 by the American Reverend Curtis Lee Laws in ultra conservative protestant circles in the US. Fundamentalism was the US cultural and political response to modernity, the Muslim response would be different and would come years later.
There a number of linguistic and theological reasons why fundamentalism cannot be used to describe a non-hierarchical and horizontal faith like Islam. However, the latter is not my purpose in this article. Thus, the term fundamentalism is accurate to refer to the numerous Christian movements against modernity that shaped American policies in the late Eighties (the Moral Majority, Christian Voice etc…). It’s also proper to appeal to the so-called televangelists who carried out extraordinary messianic lobbying for military expenditure and imperial expansion in the Eighties. In Sunni Islam, though, the term extreme versions of political Islam is more accurate.
Finally, the debates around the nature of the word Jihad are abundant and most assertions are culturally biased. Literarily Jihad means effort to struggle in Arabic. However, Islamic scholars make a fundamental distinction between al-jihad al-akbar (the greater jihad) and al-jihad al-asghar (the lesser jihad). The former, is about making a personal inwardly process to be a better human being every day, whereas the latter is about self-preservation, about Muslim self-defence, what Christian theologians would call just war. In this article I’ll use the term Jihad to refer to the Jihad al-asghar.
And the Saudis entered the world scene
Promoting and financing extreme versions of political Islam was an excellent mechanism to fight anti-colonial nationalism and communism in the late Cold War. The instances are numerous and many are very well documented: the islamisation of Algeria in the Eighties, the Saudi-sponsored Safari Club in Africa and Asia; the funding of the Islamic resistance in the Soviet War in Afghanistan; and or the sponsoring of the Muslim Brotherhood in Nasser’s and Sadat’s Egypt, are some examples. The Muslim Brotherhood was officially founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a young teacher inspired by the ideas of Jammal al-Din al-Afghani. In 1948 the organisation was outlawed and its members were persecuted by Egypt’s former regimes. However, the organisation adopted a much more radical position during the mid-Fifties as a result of Nasser’s severe persecution and incarceration of its members. Mohammed Qutb is perhaps the most visible intellectual figure of the movement.
In contrast to Christianity, Sunni Islam is a decentralised, non-hierarchical transnational religion. Common practices and traditions bring Muslims together rather than a clergy, a Pope, or a network of churches with a particular affiliation. This flexible and non-institutionalisedstructure has facilitated the spread of extreme versions of Islam, such as the Wahhabi doctrine in its multiple manifestations.
Since the alliance of Wahhabi sheikhs and the House of Saud in the XVIII century, an ultra-conservative form of political Islam is official in Saudi Arabia. Organisations like the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice and the Islamic Religious Police are in charge of enforcing Sharia Law and thestrictest cultural aspects of Wahhabi Islam. Its wild neoliberal economy is boosted by millions of disenfranchised migrant workers and ethnic minorities who have no rights in this authoritarian ethnocracy. Their endeavour to promote social engineering projects in the region has worked efficiently, though.
Rolling-back the state and the Muslim Brotherhood
Last spring when electoral commissions declared an overwhelming victory for the Freedom and Justice Party and the Al-Nur Party, the political formations of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, respectively, serious political analysts were not surprised. To understand this electoral outcome one must understand several issues that range from human geography and diaspora, to neo-liberalism and private education. Certainly, after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak there was an increase in the money that flowed from Saudi Arabia to mosques, political and religious leaders in Egypt. Nevertheless, the reasons that explain the shift towards the Islamisation of Egyptian politics are much more complex.
Pushed by the neoliberal troika of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation, the liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of the Egyptian economy, which started back in the Seventies during the presidency of Anwar Sadat (1971-1980), is strongly linked to the increase of the Saudi cultural and political sway. From the early Nineties onwards, the Egyptian technocrats under the supervision of Hosni Mubarak enthusiastically followed the structural adjustment policies recommended, when not imposed, by these international organisations and foreign investors. The soaring cuts in social services, health care, public education and social security soon translated into unemployment, despair and shanty towns. In 2012 more than half a million Egyptians, many moved by neo-liberal urbanisation pressures and extreme poverty, were driven to live in Cairo’s 6.4KM cemetery known as ‘The City of Dead’. In the rural areas the panorama is even more pitiful.
The relationship between rolling-back-the-state policies and the exacerbation of extreme versions of political Islam is very clear. When public schools started closing in Egypt’s disadvantaged areas there was a proliferation of religious volunteer-run schools. These schools mainly received funding either from the Egyptian diaspora or from the Gulf countries. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), around 70% of Egyptian migrant workers live in Arab states, mainly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Historically, the number one destination for Egyptian migrant workers was Gaddafi’s Libya, but after the 1986 US bombing of Libya, thousands of Egyptians saw in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States a safer platform to work. In other words, the Egyptian diaspora switched from a ‘secular’, ‘pan-Arabist’, ‘social’ ‘republic’, to the lands of Wahhabi Islam. Many secular or moderate religious Egyptians, fascinated by the economic wealth and social discipline of the khaliji autocracies, struggled to bring those cultural norms back to Egypt. Financing schools, hospitals and charities was eventually the best mechanism to set a vibrant network between Wahhabi sheikhs and Mubarak’s impoverished new generations. In its 2012 report, the IOM notes that compared to the Egyptians who migrate to North America and Europe, almost 80% of the Egyptian workers who go to the Gulf return to Egypt. Obviously, the cultural and religious sway that they bring back home has a massive impact.
Another particular issue to highlight about these private-run religious schools is that they were only open to Sunni Muslims. Coptic Christians, for instance, could not attend them, thus the children who went to these schools had no Christian friends in their childhood. Similarly, the role of the Coptic diaspora is of paramount importance in the rolling-back the state mosaic and they also funded several facilities including schools, hospitals and cultural centres. Many prominent wealthy Christian businessmen have gained profits from the neoliberal policies. Nevertheless, this article is focused on their Muslim counterparts. In cities like Cairo there are different places where Muslims and Christians can interact, but in rural areas, where sectarian and ethnic tensions are more frequent, if children don’t meet at school it’s very unlikely that they meet people from another religion. The engineering of sectarianism has always been a priority for Egypt’s tyrannical regimes. Religious segregation in private-run schools was thus very useful for the regime.
I argue that the shutting down of public-funded hospitals, schools and other public venues created a social vacuum that was rapidly taken over by Saudi Arabia and their best ally within Egypt: the migrant workers and the political and religious leaders. In fact, even though the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi groups were persecuted during former regimes, they have always been articulated through a massive network that supplied to their supporters what the state didn’t provide. Such practices of proselytism have been compared with the emergence of grass roots political and religious organisations in Palestine and Lebanon. For instance, in Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah, with the cheerleading of the Iranian government, grew in strength when it started providing the basic social services (health, education, security) that the central Lebanese government did not provide to its citizens. Analogies with Hamas in the Gaza Strip are also possible.
Finally, the media policies designed to ‘democratise’ the TV during Mubarak’s regime had a massive sway over Egyptian families. The introduction of satellite TV in Egypt led to the proliferation of religious channels, and with them came a wave sensationalist religious programmes in which sheikhs from isolated spots of the Arabian Peninsula could speak every night to Egyptian women and men. This process can be compared with the proliferation of fundamentalist televangelists in the Eighties in the United States. Many of the grass roots organisations that were of paramount importance to the Reagan administration, such as the Moral Majority or Christian Voice, used TV channels as a mechanism to indoctrinate their Christian followers. In Egypt, similarly, satellite TV has played a key role in the engineering of a new social fabric.
Conclusions
Austerity measures and the construction of a parallel provider of health care and eduction, among others, on the basis of a religious affiliation, combined with the cultural sway of the diaspora and the influence of satellite TV channels were key elements that gave rise to the political versions of Islam after the downfall of Hosni Mubarak. Extreme versions of political Islam defended by the Salafi al-Nur Party and by some factions of the Freedom and Justice Party were the clear winners of Egypt’s 2012 elections. Most young secular progressive Egyptians who poured into the streets of Cairo nearly two years ago feel that their revolution has been kidnapped.
It’s not the first time in history that the real winners of the revolution are far removed from those who organised it. Haiti, Algeria and Iran are very clear examples of this. Parallels between the unfolding of the political transition in Egypt and Iran after the 1979 Revolution are quite common. In both cases, the religious networks that were persecuted by their pro-Western puppet regimes knew how to seize the power once the dictator was out of the picture. When reading Ryszard Kapuscinski’s account of the Iranian Revolution titled ‘Shah of Shahs’, or the chapters of Frantz Fanon’s ‘Wretched of the Earth’, dedicated to the Algerian struggle against French colonialism, one can see that the three revolutions have several things in common.
The Saudi penchant for exacerbating extreme versions of political Islam is not confined to Egypt, and the Egyptian revolution isn’t their unique target. The systematic militarisation and Islamisation of the Syrian armed opposition sponsored by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states is a clear demonstration of the Saudi wish to secure another Jordanian-style regime in the Mediterranean Levant. Jihadist groups from all over the Middle East have arrived in Syria to fight the Al-Assad regime. Similarly, as thousands of Syrian children live in refugee camps in neighbouring Turkey, waiting for a ceasefire to return to their homes in Hama, Damascus or Aleppo, opportunistic sheikhs from the Gulf struggle to win their confidence in the middle of their plight. Any similarity with the Islamisation of Afghanistan in the Eighties is not coincidental, is a worrying reality.








